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Abstract 
In  this  paper  we  use  English  school  level  data  from  1993  to  2008  aggregated  up  to  small 
neighbourhood areas to look at the determinants of the demand for private education in  England 
from the ages of 7 until 15 (the last year of compulsory schooling). We focus on the relative 
importance of price and quality of schooling.  However, there are likely to be unobservable factors 
that are correlated with private school prices and/or the quality of state schools that also impact 
on the demand for private schooling which could bias our estimates. Our long regional and local 
authority  panel  data  allows  us  to  employ  a  number  of  strategies  to  deal  with  this  potential 
endogeneity. Because of the likely presence of incidental trends in our unobservables, we employ 
a double difference system GMM approach to remove both fixed effects and incidental trends. We 
find that the demand for private schooling is inversely related to private school fees  as well as the 
quality of state schooling in the local area at the time families were making key schooling choice 
decisions at the ages of 7, 11 and 13. We estimate that a one standard deviation increase in the 
private  school  day  fee  when  parents/students  are  making  these  key  decisions  reduces  the 
proportion  attending  private  schools  by  around  0.33  percentage  points  which  equates  to  an 
elasticity of around -0.26. This estimate is only significant for choices at age 7 (but the point 
estimates are very similar at the ages of 11 and 13). At age 11 and age 13, an increase in the 
quality of local state secondary reduces the probability of attending private schools. At age 11, a 
one standard deviation increase in state school quality reduces participation in private schools by 
0.31 percentage points which equates to an elasticity of -0.21.  The effect at age 13 is slightly 
smaller, but still significant. Demand for private schooling at the ages of 8, 9, 10 and 12,  14 and 15 
are  almost  entirely  determined  by  private  school  demand  in  the  previous  year  for  the  same 
cohort, and price and quality do not impact significantly on this decision other than through their 
initial influence on the key participation decisions at the ages of 7, 11 and 13.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper looks at the impact of private school fees and school quality on the demand for private 
secondary schooling in the UK. This topic has not been examined before in the UK and almost all 
research on this issue has used US data.  
There are some papers looking at the demand for private schooling in the UK. A recent paper by 
Blow, Blundell and Machin (2010) using UK Family Expenditure Data shows that household demand 
for private schooling is positively related to income, but also positively to regional inequality. Recent 
work by Dearden and Sibieta  (2010) using the British Household Panel Survey shows that that  the 
probability of attending a  private schooling is related to household  income and  parental education 
but is also more likely if one  of  the child’s  parents went to a private school when they were young. 
Neither of these papers, however,  explicitly consider  the impact of private school fees  or school 
quality on the demand for education. A number of papers have looked at how parental preferences 
for state schools are related to school quality (recent examples include  Hansen and Machin (2010) 
and Burgess and Vignoles (2009)) but they do not consider choices between the state and private 
sector, only choices within the state sector. In a series of papers, Gibbons and Machin  (2003, 2006, 
2008) examine the relationship between local state school quality (at primary level) and local house 
prices, and attempt to recover the implicit price of attending high-performing state schools. 
However, they  also are unable to consider the private sector in such analysis.  
The key problem with trying to estimate the causal impact of price and quality is that there are likely 
to be unobservable factors that are correlated with private school prices and/or the quality of 
private and state schooling as well as the demand for private schooling which would bias any 
estimates.  Moreover, it is highly likely that these unobservable factors are changing over time. 
Coming up with a credible way of controlling for this potential endogeneity is therefore a key issue. 
One paper which does this in a convincing way is Dynarski et. al. (2009). They only have cross-
sectional data but use variation in private school tuition that arises through sibling discounts and use 3 
 
this within-neighbourhood variation in tuition price to identify the price elasticity of demand (as this 
within neighbourhood variation means that  unobserved determinants of demand can be controlled 
with a neighbourhood fixed effect).  They estimate the price elasticity of demand for private 
schooling in the US and find that a standard deviation decrease in tuition prices increases the 
probability of a family sending their child to private schools by 0.5 of a percentage point which 
translates into an elasticity of -0.19.   
In this paper we use rich English schools data which records the number of children in every state 
and private school by age and gender from 1996 to 2008 from the age of 7 until 15. We use this data 
to calculate the proportion of children in private schooling at a fine neighbourhood level over a 13 
year period from 1996 to 2008. In the paper, we consider private school participation from the age 
of 7 through to 15. At age 7, most children have the option of attending a private primary school 
whereas before that time private schooling is not always an option. Age 15 is the last year of 
compulsory schooling in the UK.  As might be expected, we find that private school attendance is a 
dynamic process, and understanding what drives the initial decision to enter private schooling is a 
crucial part of understanding what determines the demand for private schooling at subsequent ages. 
It turns out that private school decisions at age 7, 11 and 13 are the key points at  which fees and 
state school quality can impact on demand for private schooling. For other years, attendance in the 
previous year is the key determinant of the demand for private schooling.  
 Our neighbourhood measure is at the local authority.  There are 150 local authorities in England, 
each of which is responsible for state school in their area. Unlike in the US, schools within each local 
authority are not funded through local taxation. Instead, they are largely funded via grants from 
central government, raised through centrally collected taxes. Around  90 per cent of children attend 
state secondary schools in their own local authority and local authorities decide on admissions 
policies for most state schools in their authority. This allows us to identify how variation in prices 
and school quality over time impact on the demand for private schooling at each age. 4 
 
In the UK, the overall demand for private schooling has remained very flat at around just over 7 per 
cent for the period under examination (and as Blundell et. al.  (2010) show this is also true for the 
last 30 years).  However over this period there has been changes in the regional patterns of private 
school attendance with some areas seeing large increases, other large decreases and yet others not 
much change at all.  
This means we need to come up with a methodological approach which can account for these 
differing trends in the observed and unobserved changes in regional demand for private education. 
In  Dynarski et. al. (2009) the unobserved determinants of demand can be controlled with a local 
authority fixed effect. However they are dealing with just one cross-section. In our reasonably long 
panel this may not be a credible strategy. In this paper we develop a system GMM panel data 
estimation method that allows for incidental trends in the unobserved determinants of demand for 
private schooling and this turns out to be important for the question we are looking at.  
We find that the demand for private schooling at age of 7 (the first year when the majority of 
students enter private schools for primary education) is inversely related to private school fees. We 
estimate that a one standard deviation increase in fees reduces the demand for private schooling at 
age 7 by 0.33 percentage points which equates to an elasticity of -0.26.  Between the ages of 8 and 
10,  private school attendance in the previous year is the key determinant of private schooling  and 
controlling for incidental trends is crucial in deriving consistent estimates.  
At age 11, the demand for private schooling is related to private school attendance in the previous 
year, as well as being  inversely related to state school quality and private school fees (though the 
fee effect is not significant at conventional levels).  An increase in the quality of local state secondary 
schools  of one standard deviation when the child is 10 reduces the probability of 11 year olds 
attending private schools by 0.31 percentage points, which equates to an elasticity of -0.21.  The 
price elasticity at this age is similar to that found at age 7 but is not statistically significant. Demand 
for private schooling at the age of 13 is also inversely related to price and state school quality, 5 
 
however the price effect is not significant and the impact of quality is significant but lower than at 
age 11. Demand for private schooling at the ages of 12, 14 and 15 is almost entirely determined by 
demand in the previous year for the same cohort and price and quality to not impact on this decision 
other than through their initial influence on the participation decision at ages 7 and/or  11 and/or 
13. 
Our paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe the data we use in the paper and our 
empirical approach. In section 3 we discuss the results of our modelling. In section 4 we conclude. 
2. Data and Estimation Strategy 
2.1 Introduction 
In this paper we make use of detailed English schools administrative data from 1993 to 2008 
to look at the determinants of the demand for private education.  
We use two sources of school administrative data. The first is the school census data (LEASIS 
data) which from 1996 records the number of pupils in every school in England for every age 
group in the private and state sector. It also records information on the number of children 
receiving and eligible for free school meals in all of the state schools (a measure of socio-
economic status) as well as information on the proportion of children in the school with 
special educational needs and items like authorised and unauthorised absences. It also has 
information on pupil teacher ratios at the school (for schools in the state and independent 
sector).  
From 1993 to 2008 we know the results of GCSE exams taken by 15/16 year olds in England 
for every secondary school in the country (the last exam before children can leave school). 6 
 
In this paper we use as our quality measure the proportion of children achieving the 
expected level at age 15/16 (which is 5 or more GCSEs with a mark of A*,A, B or C).   
In this paper we concentrate on looking at the demand for private schooling between the 
ages of 7 and 15 in England. We start at age 7 (Year 3 of primary school) as a significant 
proportion of private schooling begins at this age. In most local authorities secondary school 
starts in year 7 when all children are aged 11 at the beginning of the school year. However, 
in some local authorities they have middle schools, and children do not start at secondary 
school until Year 9 (age 13 at the beginning of the school year). Also, a significant proportion 
of boys’ private secondary schools, have large intakes at Year 9 or indeed only start at Year 9 
(Eton perhaps being the most famous example).  However, students also attend private 
schools for primary education, so demand for secondary private schooling will also depend 
on earlier primary school choices. Hence our modelling takes a dynamic approach and looks 
at the demand at each age, beginning at age 7. It turns out that these dynamics are very 
important in explaining private school demand. 
The second data source we use is the annual census of the Independent Schools Council. 
This goes back to 1983 and contains the average private school fee for boarding and day 
schools across broad regions in the UK. We focus on the fee level of day schools within 
these broad regions, as boarding schools are much more likely to be attended by pupils 
from all over the country rather than just those in the region or local authority. We have fee 
information dating back to the mid 1980s.
2 
2.2 Estimation Strategy 
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We begin by modelling the demand for private schooling at age 7
3 (measured as the 
proportion of children in private schools) as a function of the known fees and school quality 
when the child was aged 5 or 6 (when parents were making the decision).  This is generally 
the first time parents will consider private schooling (although some children will attend 
private preparatory schools before this age). 
The next major decision point is when the child is aged 10 (generally in October when the 
child has just commenced in Year 6) when parents must decide whether they want their 
child to be educated up to age 15 in a state or private secondary school. However, a 
significant proportion of children choosing private education at 11 will already be in the 
private sector so we need to account for this within a dynamic framework.  In some areas 
and for some private schools, secondary schooling starts at age 13, so this is an important 
age for some parents if they are going to switch sectors.  
Our modelling set-up is very general and models the demand for private schooling from all 
ages from 7 to 15. However, as mentioned earlier, we need to account for the fact that 
school quality and fees are potentially endogenous or pre-determined. It is also highly likely 
that unobserved determinants of demand have changed over this long time period and if we 
do not take this into account our estimates could be biased. So we begin with a general 
model of the form: 
   
              
      
         
           
      
         
            (1) 
where      is a vector of strictly exogenous variables (such as time dummies and other 
exogenous determinants of demand),     is a vector of pre-determined covariates as well as 
                                                           
3 At age 7 we mean children who are 7 at the beginning of the beginning of the school year and who will turn 8 
sometime during the year. These children are in Year 3 of primary school.  8 
 
potentially endogenous covariates such as school quality measures in the state and private 
sector and private school fees (with some lag).  This is the model developed by Blundell and 
Bond (1998) and others, the exception is that we allow the unobserved group level effect   
  
to vary incidentally with time t. First differencing removes the unobserved fixed effect    
  
however it does not remove the incidental trend (if it is present). If, however, we double 
difference the incidental trend is removed.  
Double differencing equation  (1) gives: 
         
            
 
    
              
                 
 
                                           ( 2) 
 
Clearly in this model         and  
        are correlated with      , violating one of the moment 
conditions and meaning OLS estimation of (2)  is severely biased (see Han and Phillips (2010) ). But, 
         and         are not correlated with       so can be used to instrument         and 
       . Clearly in this the error term is likely to be subject to second order autocorrelation but if 
our model is correctly specified it should not have third order autocorrelation. We test for this in our 
estimation procedure.  
Of course, if there is no incidental trend, we need only first difference and use standard system 
GMM  estimation.  However  if  there  is  an  incidental  trend,  then  the  first  difference  moment 
conditions are violated and we would expect our traditional system GMM estimates to be upward 
biased if the unobserved incidental trend is positively related to our variable of interest (which is 
what we would expect for lagged participation and fees as it  is highly likely that unobserved trend 
increases in private school demand are positively correlated with increases lagged participation, and 
increases in  private school fees) and downward bias coefficients if negatively correlated to this 
incidental trend (which is what we might expect with state school quality as it is highly likely that 
unobserved trend  increases  in  private school  demand  are  inversely related  to  changes  in  state 
school quality).  
We estimate (2) using a modified version of the Blundell and Bond (1998) Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) system estimator where the levels equation is now a first difference equation and 
the difference equation is a double difference equation, and where we now add the first difference 9 
 
equation to the system together with our double difference equation. This is related to the double 
difference estimators suggested by Han and Phillips (2010) where there is an incidental trend.  
2.2 Data Description 
 
For our identification strategy to work we need variation within region in private school fees and 
school quality over time. This is because we need to control for differences across regions in factors 
such as average income, parental education and taste for private education using regional fixed 
effects with an incidental trend. We have just under 150 local authorities in our data but we 
aggregate it up to 9 broader regions to demonstrate the variability we have (we demonstrate it 
empirically in the next section).  
Broadly speaking, private school attendance in England has remained largely unchanged at just over 
7 per cent for the last 30 years. Over the period we consider, private school attendance at secondary 
schools reduced slightly from 7.3% in 1996 to 6.9% in 2001 and 2002, before increasing to 7.4% in 
2008.   However the patterns differ by age group as can be seen in the Table 2.1 below (where we 
show the proportion attending at age 7, age 11 (first year of secondary school), age 13 and age 15 
(last year of compulsory school). Over the same time period real private schools fees have increased  
fairly rapidly with average real growth of 3.8% per year. However this increase has been far from 
smooth. In 2004 real  day fees went up  by 6.8 per cent whereas in 1998 the comparable figure was 
1.8 per cent. The proportion of pupils achieving 5 GCSEs at A*-C (the expected level at age 15) has 
risen steadily in the state sector and much faster than in the independent sector, but from a much 
lower base. We do not use independent school quality in our analysis as a number of independent 
schools have started taking exams at 16 which are not included in the standard measures of school 
quality and hence from 2006 this data is not reliable.  However over this period the proportion 
getting GCSEs at A*-C  rose in independent schools rose from around 81 per cent to 91 per cent.  
   10 
 
TABLE 2.1: Summary statistics (mean and [standard deviations])  for  key variables 
Year  Proportion 
Private  
at age 7 
Proportion 
Private 
at age 11 
Proportion 
Private 
at age 13 
Day fee 
Private 










1996  0.048  0.069  0.073  0.078  6399  0.427  0.184 
  [ 0.042]  [ 0.053]  [ 0.054]  [ 0.059]  [   662]  [ 0.078]  [ 0.107] 
1997  0.049  0.07  0.071  0.077  6565  0.435  0.182 
  [ 0.043]  [ 0.052]  [ 0.053]  [ 0.058]  [   705]  [ 0.077]  [ 0.105] 
1998  0.05  0.068  0.07  0.076  6680  0.449  0.176 
  [ 0.044]  [ 0.052]  [ 0.054]  [ 0.058]  [   770]  [ 0.082]  [ 0.105] 
1999  0.051  0.066  0.07  0.073  6978  0.468  0.169 
  [ 0.045]  [ 0.051]  [ 0.054]  [ 0.056]  [   714]  [ 0.080]  [ 0.100] 
2000  0.051  0.066  0.069  0.073  7227  0.479  0.166 
  [ 0.045]  [ 0.052]  [ 0.053]  [ 0.057]  [   812]  [ 0.080]  [ 0.102] 
2001  0.052  0.067  0.068  0.072  7589  0.49  0.16 
  [ 0.046]  [ 0.054]  [ 0.053]  [ 0.056]  [   875]  [ 0.077]  [ 0.099] 
2002  0.054  0.069  0.069  0.072  8025  0.506  0.151 
  [ 0.047]  [ 0.054]  [ 0.053]  [ 0.056]  [   924]  [ 0.075]  [ 0.094] 
2003  0.054  0.069  0.07  0.071  8378  0.522  0.148 
  [ 0.046]  [ 0.054]  [ 0.054]  [ 0.055]  [  1016]  [ 0.069]  [ 0.093] 
2004  0.054  0.07  0.072  0.072  8943  0.531  0.147 
  [ 0.047]  [ 0.054]  [ 0.055]  [ 0.056]  [  1103]  [ 0.066]  [ 0.093] 
2005  0.054  0.07  0.071  0.073  9261  0.561  0.144 
  [ 0.046]  [ 0.054]  [ 0.054]  [ 0.056]  [  1114]  [ 0.060]  [ 0.093] 
2006  0.054  0.072  0.071  0.074  9470  0.585  0.139 
  [ 0.047]  [ 0.056]  [ 0.054]  [ 0.057]  [  1177]  [ 0.055]  [ 0.089] 
2007  0.055  0.073  0.071  0.073  9667  0.614  0.137 
  [ 0.048]  [ 0.055]  [ 0.055]  [ 0.056]  [  1212]  [ 0.051]  [ 0.088] 
2008  0.055  0.075  0.074  0.075  9926  0.656  0.136 
  [ 0.049]  [ 0.059]  [ 0.056]  [ 0.057]  [  1293]  [ 0.048]  [ 0.085] 
All years   0.052  0.07  0.071  0.074  8134  0.52  0.156 
  [ 0.046]  [ 0.054]  [ 0.054]  [ 0.056]  [  1566]  [ 0.097]  [ 0.097] 
Note: fees are measured in  2007-08 prices , and are measured yearly as three time the  termly fee.  
This summary masks significant variation in the level of private school attendance, fee levels and 
average state school quality across regions. In Appendix 1 we show the variation in private school 
attendance (at age 15) for each of our 149 local authorities but in Figure 1 below we show 
differences in private school participation (at age 15), private school real day fees and state school 
quality  across nine  English regions between 1996 and 2008. As can be seen, even at these broad 
regional levels there is significant variation across region. This is even more true at the local 
authority level (as seen in Appendix 1) and it is this variation across local authority that we exploit in 
this paper.  11 
 
Figure 1: Proportion of 15 year olds in private schools 1996-2008 
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Figure 3: Proportion of 15 year olds reaching expected level in state schools, 1993-2008 
 
3. Results 
The results of our preferred double difference GMM system estimation procedure is shown in Table 
3.1.  It turns out that using a double difference model is important in this context as the system 
GMM estimates of the lagged dependent variable for  a number of ages is close to a unit root and in 
some cases unstable. This is probably due to there being an incidental trend in our unobserved fixed 
effect which renders the traditional system GMM invalid (because of the  violation of the required 
moment conditions). The results of doing the traditional system GMM estimation procedure is 
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Estimate  Elasticity  SD 
Increase 
Estimate  Elasticity  SD 
Increase 
Estimate  Elasticity  SD 
Increase 
Estimate  Elasticity  SD 
Increase 
 
      
          0.591      0.747      0.945     
        [ 0.067]      [ 0.082]      [ 0.035]     
 
          0.004  0.075  0.093  -0.006  -0.081  -0.132  0.009  0.118  0.198  0.004  0.048  0.083 
  [ 0.012]  [ 0.210]  [ 0.262]  [ 0.014]  [ 0.180]  [ 0.294]  [ 0.012]  [ 0.155]  [ 0.260]  [ 0.010]  [ 0.124]  [ 0.214] 
 
          -0.015  -0.263  -0.328  -0.017  -0.224  -0.366  -0.014  -0.181  -0.303       
  [ 0.007]  [ 0.123]  [ 0.153]  [ 0.015]  [ 0.204]  [ 0.333]  [ 0.013]  [ 0.164]  [ 0.274]       
 
        0.002  0.014  0.016  -0.032  -0.211  -0.304  0.003  0.019  0.029  -0.009  -0.054  -0.082 
  [ 0.008]  [ 0.069]  [ 0.076]  [ 0.012]  [ 0.081]  [ 0.117]  [ 0.007]  [ 0.046]  [ 0.067]  [ 0.010]  [ 0.064]  [ 0.098] 
 
        0.013  0.117  0.129  -0.015  -0.098  -0.141  -0.019  -0.125  -0.185       
  [ 0.012]  [ 0.105]  [ 0.116]  [ 0.018]  [ 0.121]  [ 0.173]  [ 0.010]  [ 0.065]  [ 0.095]       
 
          0.005  0.015  0.052  -0.067  -0.169  -0.751  0.007  0.018  0.083  -0.045  -0.106  -0.5 
  [ 0.016]  [ 0.052]  [ 0.177]  [ 0.027]  [ 0.068]  [ 0.302]  [ 0.019]  [ 0.046]  [ 0.211]  [ 0.035]  [ 0.083]  [ 0.390] 
 
          -0.007  -0.022  -0.076  -0.11  -0.276  -1.228  -0.015  -0.036  -0.163       
  [ 0.033]  [ 0.109]  [ 0.369]  [ 0.044]  [ 0.110]  [ 0.490]  [ 0.028]  [ 0.069]  [ 0.314]       
                         
No. Of observations    1788      1639      1639      1639   
AR(1) p-value    0.000      0.000      0.000      0.000   
AR(2) p-value    0.001      0.015      0.028      0.019   
AR(3) p-value    0.290      0.596      0.838      0.983   
GMM Lags    3 to 5      3 to 6      4 to 7      4 to 7   
Hansen test p-value    0.142      0.170      0.054      0.114   
                         
Note: All regressions include time dummies and use robust two stage system GMM estimation (see Windmeijer (2005)).  There are 149 groups in our panel. Frt  refers to day fees in region r at 
time t, Qrt  to proportion of children obtaining the expected level in state secondary schools at time t in region r  and FSMrt refers to the proportion of children eligible for free school meals in 
state secondary schools in region r at time t.  14 
 
If we start by focusing on the results at age 7 we see that fees at age 5 (when parents were making 
their primary school choice) have a negative impact on private school attendance at age 7. A  one 
standard deviation increase in fees reduces the demand for private schooling at age 7 by 0.33 
percentage points which equates to an elasticity of -0.26.  This is very close to the elasticity found by 
Dynarski et. al. (2009).  Secondary state school quality has no effect on the primary school decision 
but impacts on  demand at ages 11 and 13. We have not included primary state school quality in our 
regressions as this information is not available for the time period under consideration. No other 
factors impact on demand (after we have done our double differencing).  
At ages 8, 9 and 10, the demand for private schooling is determined by participation in the previous 
year. No other factors influence demand
4. 
If we move to participation at age 11, we see that fees in the previous two years have a negative 
impact on participation, but this effect is not significant at conventional levels. In particular, fees at 
age 9, when parents are making their secondary school decision, have a similar elasticity to that 
found at age 7 (-0.22), but this estimate is not significant at conventional levels.  However, now the 
quality of state secondary schools impacts on demand for private schooling with an increase of one 
standard deviation in state school quality at age 10 reducing private school demand at age 11 by 
0.31 percentage points which equates to an elasticity of -0.21.  
If we move on to look at demand at age 13, another key moving point in the English education 
system, we similar negative but slightly smaller effects of price and quality on demand, although 
once again the fees effect is not significant at conventional levels.  A one standard deviation increase 
in state school quality at age 11 decreases participation in private schooling at age 13 by 0.19 
percentage points which equates to an elasticity of -0.13.  
At age 15, the final year of secondary school, it is only participation in the previous year that explains 
demand for private schooling. Similar findings are found for participation at age 12 and age 14.  
Hence price and quality impact on the demand for private education in the expected way. However, 
private school demand in England is a dynamic process and prices and quality only have direct 
impacts at key moving points in the education cycle at the ages of 7, 11 and 13. For other ages, fees 
and quality only impact on the demand for private schooling via their effect on lagged demand.    
                                                           
4 These results are available from the authors.  15 
 
4. Conclusions 
In this paper we use English school level data from 1993 to 2008 aggregated up to small 
neighbourhood areas to look at the determinants of the demand for private education in  England 
from the ages of 7 until 15 (the last year of compulsory schooling). We focus on the relative 
importance of price and quality of schooling.  However, there are likely to be unobservable factors 
that are correlated with private school prices and/or the quality of state schools that also impact on 
the demand for private schooling which could bias our estimates. Our long regional and local 
authority panel data allows us to employ a number of strategies to deal with this potential 
endogeneity. Because of the likely presence of incidental trends in our unobservables, we employ a 
double difference system GMM approach to remove both fixed effects and incidental trends. We 
find that the demand for private schooling is inversely related to private school fees  as well as the 
quality of state schooling in the local area at the time families were making key schooling choice 
decisions at the ages of 7, 11 and 13. We estimate that a one standard deviation increase in the 
private school day fee when parents/students are making these key decisions reduces the 
proportion attending private schools by around 0.33 percentage points which equates to an 
elasticity of around -0.26. This estimate is only significant for choices at age 7 (but the point 
estimates are very similar at the ages of 11 and 13). At age 11 and age 13, an increase in the quality 
of local state secondary reduces the probability of attending private schools. At age 11, a one 
standard deviation increase in state school quality reduces participation in private schools by 0.31 
percentage points which equates to an elasticity of -0.21.  The effect at age 13 is slightly smaller, but 
still significant. Demand for private schooling at the ages of 8, 9, 10 and 12,  14 and 15 are almost 
entirely determined by private school demand in the previous year for the same cohort, and price 
and quality to not impact significantly on this decision other than through their initial influence on 
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Appendix 2 – Traditional System GMM estimates 
TABLE A.2: Traditional System GMM Estimates of the Demand for Private Schooling for 7, 11, 13 and 15 year olds.  
 
Variable  
     
         
         
         
   
Estimate  Elasticity  SD 
Increase 
Estimate  Elasticity  SD 
Increase 
Estimate  Elasticity  SD 
Increase 
Estimate  Elasticity  SD 
Increase 
       
          0.918      0.942      1.009     
        [ 0.093]      [ 0.035]      [ 0.011]     
           0.105  1.823  2.273  -0.004  -0.055  -0.09  0.031  0.395  0.661  0.006  0.074  0.128 
  [ 0.031]  [ 0.548]  [ 0.683]  [ 0.031]  [ 0.412]  [ 0.672]  [ 0.013]  [ 0.168]  [ 0.281]  [ 0.002]  [ 0.028]  [ 0.048] 
           -0.004  -0.069  -0.086  0.011  0.143  0.234  -0.02  -0.254  -0.426       
  [ 0.027]  [ 0.475]  [ 0.592]  [ 0.031]  [ 0.415]  [ 0.678]  [ 0.011]  [ 0.145]  [ 0.243]       
         0.078  0.681  0.748  -0.038  -0.255  -0.367  -0.004  -0.028  -0.041  0  0.003  0.004 
  [ 0.024]  [ 0.209]  [ 0.230]  [ 0.020]  [ 0.131]  [ 0.188]  [ 0.007]  [ 0.045]  [ 0.066]  [ 0.003]  [ 0.022]  [ 0.033] 
         0.109  0.951  1.045  0.013  0.086  0.123  -0.008  -0.052  -0.076       
  [ 0.027]  [ 0.087]  [ 0.297]  [ 0.020]  [ 0.050]  [ 0.225]  [ 0.011]  [ 0.026]  [ 0.121]       
           0.004  0.013  0.045  -0.007  -0.019  -0.084  -0.013  -0.033  -0.15  -0.001  -0.002  -0.007 
  [ 0.039]  [ 0.129]  [ 0.440]  [ 0.025]  [ 0.062]  [ 0.278]  [ 0.010]  [ 0.024]  [ 0.108]  [ 0.003]  [ 0.008]  [ 0.037] 
           0.053  0.173  0.588  0.037  0.094  0.418  -0.007  -0.018  -0.081       
  [ 0.038]  [ 0.126]  [ 0.429]  [ 0.024]  [ 0.061]  [ 0.272]  [ 0.008]  [ 0.020]  [ 0.093]       
                         
No. Of observations    1937      1788      1788      1788   
AR(1) p-value    0      0      0      0   
AR(2) p-value    0.074      0.205      0.933      0.505   
AR(3) p-value    0.443      0.533      0.532      0.896   
GMM Lags    3 to 5      3 to 6      3 to 6      2 to 5   
Hansen test p-value    0.01      0.107      0.272      0.126   
                         
Note: see notes to Table 331 
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